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Abstract From the point of view of proof-theoretic
semantics, it is argued that the sequent calculus with
introduction rules on the assertion and on the assumption
side represents deductive reasoning more appropriately
than natural deduction. In taking consequence to be con-
ceptually prior to truth, it can cope with non-well-founded
phenomena such as contradictory reasoning. The fact that,
in its typed variant, the sequent calculus has an explicit and
separable substitution schema in form of the cut rule, is
seen as a crucial advantage over natural deduction, where
substitution is built into the general framework.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we discuss what it means for the format of
deductive reasoning when what we have called the ‘‘dogmas
of standard semantics’’ (see Schroeder-Heister 2008; 2011a)
are given up. The first and main dogma is the priority of the
categorical over the hypothetical. This dogma means that
hypothetical concepts are explained in terms of categorical
concepts, so that the hypothetical concepts have a derivative
status. In standard model-theoretic semantics the categorical
concept is that of truth in a model. The hypothetical concept
of consequence is then defined by saying that whenever
the antecedents of a consequence statement are true, then so
is the consequent. By ‘consequence’ I here mean material
consequence, not necessarily formal consequence. The latter
is obtained from material consequence by abstracting from
non-logical features of the propositions involved, which in
the model-theoretic case is achieved by quantifying over all
models. The dogma of the priority of the categorical over the
hypothetical holds for standard proof-theoretic explanations
of consequence as well. For example, in Dummett-Prawitz-
style proof-theoretic semantics based on a proof-theoretic
notion of validity, the validity of assumption-free (or
‘closed’) proofs is defined first, and the validity of hypo-
thetical (or ‘open’) proofs and thus the notion of consequence
is defined in terms of that of closed proofs (see Schroeder-
Heister 2006).
The second dogma of standard semantics, which is a
specialization of the first one, is the transmission view of
consequence. In the model-theoretic case it means that
consequence can be established by showing that truth (in a
model) transmits from the antecedents to the consequent of
the consequence claim. In the proof-theoretic case it means
that there is a procedure which transforms proofs of the
antecedents into a proof of the consequent. There are
several variants of the proof-theoretic approach: besides
the above mentioned Dummett-Prawitz-style semantics e.g.
the BHK-interpretation or Lorenzen’s admissibility inter-
pretation of the logical constants. They all understand this
transmission as a constructive procedure, whereas in the
classical model-theoretic case it is essentially a metalin-
guistic universally quantified ‘if… then…’. Together with
the transmission view of consequence comes the place-
holder view of assumptions, which is the idea that in
deductions open assumptions are ‘satisfied’ by proofs of
them.
The third dogma is the equivalence of valid consequence
and correctness of inference, or at least that valid conse-
quence entails the correctness of inference. Whenever a
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consequence statement is valid, we can proceed inferen-
tially from its antecedents to its consequent, i.e., a valid
consequence licenses a corresponding inference. This is
what soundness of inference rules means.
What is common to all these dogmas is that assumptions
or hypothetical claims are not given a status in their own
right. They are dependent on categorical concepts and their
handling. We argue instead for an alternative approach
which takes consequence and thus the hypothetical concept
first and considers categorical truth to be a limiting case of
consequence, namely consequence without assumptions.
The formal model of this approach is Gentzen’s sequent
calculus, whose semantical significance has not been
appropriately acknowledged, contrary to his calculus of
natural deduction, which has been the dominant formal
model in meaning-theoretical investigations.
The rationale for this different approach is not only the
general philosophical consideration of the notion of con-
sequence. The standard approach has certain limits which
can be overcome by considering the hypothetical concept.
The most fundamental of these limits is the well-founded-
ness assumption, which means that the categorical concepts
(truth, canonical provability) are defined in a strictly well-
founded way, leaving no space for issues such as circularity
or infinitely descending definitional chains. Non-well-
founded phenomena are apparently present, for example, in
the paradoxes, and an approach to reasoning should be able
to deal with them. The approach based on hypothetical
consequence as the primary concept is versatile enough to
achieve this. It covers the well-founded case, but still
allows one to deal with irreducibly paradoxical statements
such as self-contradiction.
2 Definitional Freedom1
One can avoid non-well-foundedness by requiring that,
when we define something, this must be carried out in a
stepwise, well-founded fashion. However, this is not as easy
to achieve as it may appear at first glance, since a definition
does not always exhibit whether it is well-founded or not.
For example, if we deal with clausal definitions as in logic
programming, which are similar to inductive definitions, it is
not even always decidable whether a particular substitution
instance of a defined proposition has a well-founded defi-
nitional chain. This corresponds to the fact well-known from
recursive function theory that being total is not generally a
decidable property of a partial recursive function. One
would nonetheless, at least nowadays, in the age of com-
puter science, admit arbitrary partial recursive functions as
well-defined entities, and leave it to be a matter of (mathe-
matical) fact whether a function is defined (has a value) for a
particular argument or not.
One is used to well-foundedness from the case of the
standard logical constants, when proof-theoretic validity is
defined. However, not everything for which a definition can
be written down is ‘well-behaved’ in this sense, and there is
no reason to confine oneself to such cases. There is a tendency
in philosophical semantics, in particular in its proof-theoretic
branch, to concentrate on logical constants, logical conse-
quence, and logicality in general. Nevertheless, there are
concepts more general than logical ones, and the restriction to
logical concepts can prevent one from getting on overview of
what can be defined (proof-theoretically or otherwise).
We strongly propose definitional freedom in the sense
that there should be one or several formats for definitions,
but within this format one should be free. Whether a certain
definition is well-behaved is a matter of (mathematical)
‘observation’, and not something to be guaranteed from the
very beginning.
3 Type Systems for Clausal Definitions
We use clausal definitions as in logic programming, where
an atom A is defined in terms of certain conditions C1, …,








This list of clauses is called the definition of A, and a
definition (simpliciter) is a collection of such lists for
various defined atoms A. Thus a definition is exactly like a
logic program, with the exception that we do not restrict
the conditions (‘bodies’ in logic programming) to lists of
atoms, perhaps with negations. In principle we allow for
any logical composition, but we leave this point open
here. Obviously, clausal definitions can also be viewed as
inductive definitions, looked upon as rule systems (see
Aczel 1977; Denecker et al. 2001). A definition is put into
action by certain inference schemata. In which way this is
done depends on the reasoning format chosen. In a natural
deduction format, we define introduction and elimination













The introduction rules express the reasoning along defini-
tional clauses. The elimination rule corresponds to what is
1 The claim of definitional freedom, and the comparison with recur-
sive function theory is due to Hallna¨s (1991, 2006).
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known as generalized elimination rules in natural deduc-
tion. Within the general definitional setting they are very
powerful and go beyond what is available, for example, in
standard accounts of logic programming. They express the
principle of definitional reflection, which is a sort of
inversion principle according to which everything that can
be inferred from each defining condition of A can be
inferred from A itself. It develops its full power when
clauses contain variables and are not just of the proposi-
tional kind dealt with here. When we speak of ‘atoms’
which are defined, and for which introduction and elimi-
nation rules are given, we mean atoms in the sense of logic
programming, i.e., the entities to be defined, not atoms in
the logical sense. Therefore logically compound expres-
sions, for which a definition is given, would be atoms in
our sense as well. (For further details see Hallna¨s 1991;
Hallna¨s and Schroeder-Heister 1990/1991.)
In the present context it is more instructive and useful to







½x1 : C1 ½xn : Cn
..
.
. . . ..
.
t : A t1 : C tn : C
D t; x1:t1; . . .; xn:tnð Þ : C
ð1Þ
Here the ci are constructors for canonical terms of type
A, the dot denotes a binding operation, and D is a selector
with the following reduction (or equality) principle:
Dðcis; x1:t1; . . .; xn:tnÞ . ti½xi=s ð2Þ
It says that if t reduces to canonical form cis, then s can be
substituted for the variable xi in the ith minor premiss of
(1), yielding a term ti[xi/s] of type C. For simplicity we
assume that the Ci are single types (otherwise, t : Ci would
have to be understood as representing lists of typing
judgements). If there is just a single clause for A, then no
selector is needed. Instead of the rules
t : C
ct : A
x : C½ 
..
.
t1 : A t : C
D t1; x:tð Þ : C
and the reduction principle
Dðcs; x:tÞ . t½x=s






with the reduction principle
c0ct . t ð4Þ
Here c0 is the destructor that annihilates c. One should
remember our presupposition that C is a single type—a
strong simplification, which is however sufficient for the
present purposes. (Already in the case of standard con-
junction there would be a pair of types giving rise to two
direct elimination rules.)
In a sequent-style reasoning format there are right
introduction and left introduction rules for the defined
atom A:
D ‘ C1
D ‘ A . . .
D ‘ Cn
D ‘ A
D;C1 ‘ C . . . D;Cn ‘ C
D; A ‘ C
If Ci consists of more than one formula, D ‘ Ci is
understood as a list of sequents (we are not considering
multiple-formulae succedents here). In a type system, D is
a list of declarations of the form y : B, and we have the
following rules:
D ‘ t : C1
D ‘ c1t : A . . .
D ‘ t : Cn
D ‘ cnt : A
D; x1 : C1 ‘ t1 : C . . . D; xn : Cn ‘ tn : C
D; y : A ‘ Dðy; x1:t1; . . .; xn:tnÞ : C
ð5Þ
with the reduction principle (2).
In the case of a single clause for A, we can again for-
mulate the rules in the simpler direct way as follows:
D ‘ t : C
D ‘ ct : A
D; x : C ‘ t : C
D; y : A ‘ t½x=c0y : C ð6Þ
with the reduction principle (4).
We also need a term-annotated version of the rule of cut,
which is a substitution rule:
C ‘ t : A D; x : A ‘ s : B
C;D ‘ s½x=t : B ð7Þ
4 Self-Contradiction2
A most elementary circular definition, which immediately
leads to contradiction, is the definition of an atom R in
terms of its own negation :R: We understand :R in the
intuitionistic way as implying absurdity: R ? \. In this
way we can distinguish between a contradiction consisting
of the pair R and :R; and absurdity \. The letter R should
remind one of the Russell paradox. The definition of the
Russell set within naive set theory can be viewed as a
sophisticated way of defining something in terms of its own
2 The consideration of paradoxes in the clausal framework
and the self-contradictory definition of R as a standard example
and test case in a theory of definitional reasoning goes back to Hallna¨s
(1991, see also Hallna¨s and Schroeder-Heister 1990/1991).
Proof-Theoretic Semantics, Self-Contradiction 79
123
negation. Using our definitional framework we do not need
to introduce any set-theoretic notion.3
For implication we need typed introduction and elimi-
nation rules for the natural deduction framework, as well as
right and left introduction rules for the sequent framework.
For natural deduction these are the common ones of
lambda abstraction and term application:




kx:t : A ! B
s : A ! B t : A
App s; tð Þ : B
together with the reduction principle of application
reduction, which is the same as b-contraction:
Appðkx:t; sÞ . t½x=s ð8Þ
The corresponding rules for the sequent calculus are as
follows:
D; x : A ‘ t : B
D ‘ kx:t : A ! B
D ‘ t : A
D; x : A ! B ‘ Appðx; tÞ : B
together with App-reduction (8). The left introduction
rule corresponds to modus ponens, but differs from
Gentzen’s implication left rule, from which it can be
derived in two steps. Here we use it for convenience and
abbreviation. We do not discuss the point that it might
be preferable to Gentzen’s rule anyway (see Schroeder-
Heister 2011b).
Now we define the self-contradictory R as follows:
DR R :- R ! ?f
If we denote the constructor for R by r, then from (1) and
(5) we obtain the following typing rules in the natural
deduction and sequent systems:
t : R ! ?
rt : R
x : R ! ?½ 
..
.
s : R t : C
D s; x:tð Þ : C ð9Þ
and
D ‘ t : R ! ?
D ‘ rt : R
D; x : R ! ? ‘ t : C
D; y : R ‘ Dðy; x:tÞ : C ð10Þ
together with the reduction principle
Dðrs; x:tÞ . t½x=s
Instead of using (9) or (10) to derive a contradiction, we
use the simpler forms corresponding to (3) and (6)
t : R ! ?
rt : R
t : R
r0t : R ! ?
and
D ‘ t : R ! ?
D ‘ rt : R
D; x : R ! ? ‘ t : C
D; y : R ‘ t½x=r0y : C
together with the reduction principle
r0rt . t
In the natural deduction system we then obtain a typed
proof of absurdity ? as follows:
ð11Þ
The term obtained for absurdity is not normalizable,
as seen from the following reduction sequence which
loops:
Appðkx:Appðr0x; xÞ; rkx:Appðr0x; xÞÞ.
Appðr0rkx:Appðr0x; xÞ; rkx:Appðr0x; xÞÞ.
Appðkx:Appðr0x; xÞ; rkx:Appðr0x; xÞÞ
ð12Þ
This witnesses the fact that the given derivation, which
without terms can be written as follows,
ð13Þ
is not normalizable. It corresponds to what was first
observed by Prawitz (1965, Appendix B) in the context of a
natural deduction formulation for naive set theory.
In the sequent calculus, for the derivation of the
absurdity sequent ‘ ? the rule of cut is required in the last
step:
ð14Þ
3 Tennant (1982) shows that many well-known paradoxes exhibit a
proof-theoretic behavior corresponding to that of R as discussed
below: Generating a non-normalizable derivation of absurdity. He
therefore sees this feature as the characteristic property of paradox-
icality. Also Ekman (1998) argues that the proof-theoretic content of
Russell’s paradox can be stated in propositional logic by analyzing
the derivation of absurdity from self-contradiction R $ :R:
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Annotated with terms, this derivation looks as follows:
ð15Þ
The term generated for absurdity is essentially the same as
the one generated in the natural deduction variant. More
precisely, it is the second line of the looping reduction (12),
so we have again a non-normalizable term. Here it reflects
the fact that there is no cut-free proof of absurdity. If we
carry out the standard reductions for eliminating cuts, we
obtain again a non-terminating sequence of reduction steps.
We leave the details to the reader.4
5 Absurdity in Natural-Deduction-Style Reasoning
Our natural-deduction-style type system attempted to be a
framework for reasoning with respect to any definition,
including self-contradicting ones. It is based on the idea
that with a definition a corresponding pair of introduction
and elimination rules is associated, according to which we
can proceed in a natural-deduction manner starting from
assumptions (and also discharging assumptions when per-
mitted by the rules). This is a concept according to which a
valid proof is a proof composed of introduction and elim-
ination inferences of the justified kind. So we do not, as
in Dummett-Prawitz-style semantics, define the validity of
proofs first, and then the validity of rules as respecting the
validity of proofs. Dummett’s and Prawitz’s idea of putting
proofs first is intimately linked to the dogma that closed
proofs are primary to open ones, i.e., the categorical is
primary to the hypothetical. It is also linked to the well-
foundedness assumption: In Dummett and Prawitz, the
validity of (canonical) closed proofs is defined in terms of
its closed subproofs of lower complexity, something that
breaks down in the case of our definition of R. Since in
our approach rules are conceptually prior to proofs,
hypothetical proofs are simply validated by rules leading
from assumptions to conclusion, and no longer by the
transmission of valid categorical proofs.
This does not mean that we are just laying down a
formal system, as might be raised as an objection. The
introduction and elimination rules we are proposing are
not arbitrary, but are justified as rules putting definitional
clauses into action. They complement one another in the
sense of an inversion principle, making the eliminations
inverses of the introductions. However, this complemen-
tation is not based on global ideas of reducibility of proofs,
but is a local principle, which only assumes that an atom is
defined by certain conditions. It does not assume that these
conditions are of lower complexity than the atom. For more
details relating this approach to Dummett-Prawitz-style
semantics see Schroeder-Heister (2011c).
Given the definition DR of R this means that there is a
derivation of absurdity ? which has the feature that it is not
normalizable, witnessed by the fact that in typed form we
derive t : ? with non-normalizable t. Semantically, the
term t represents the knowledge one has gained by proving
t : ?: Distinguishing in the spirit of Dummett-Prawitz
semantics between indirect and direct knowledge, one
might say that a term in normal form represents direct
knowledge, whereas a non-normal term represents indirect
knowledge. According to this type of semantics, the dis-
tinction between indirect and direct knowledge is crucial,
together with the principle that indirect knowledge can
always be transferred into direct knowledge (called the
‘fundamental assumption’ by Dummett 1991, Chap. 12). In
fact, the validity of indirect knowledge is defined by ref-
erence to the direct knowledge it can be reduced to.
In our case this could lead to the suggestion that the
derivation of t : ? shows that absurdity can be proved, but
only in a sense of delivering indirect knowledge. Referring
to the non-normalizability of t, we could put forward the
idea of ‘ultimately indirect’ knowledge, i.e., knowledge
that cannot be ‘directified’. We could say that a derivation
of absurdity is possible in our generalized definitional
framework, but only by yielding ‘ultimately indirect’
evidence of it. In general we would then say that certain
definitions—those which are ‘well-behaved’—always
produce direct, i.e. ‘first-class’ knowledge, whereas others
like that of R may produce only ‘second-class knowledge’
that cannot be ‘upgraded’ to ‘first-class knowledge’ by
means of term reduction. If one wanted to give this idea a
very broad philosophical perspective, one could put it in
relation to the discussion of theoretical terms in philosophy
of science and associate with it the fact that theoretical
terms are only indirectly linked with observational ones.
This would give definitions such as DR a Quinean aspect.
However, it is not obvious what this non-directifiable
indirect knowledge actually might be. Should there be any
4 Note that we have not given a term system which codifies the
sequent-style proof directly. In order to achieve that, we would have
to present a term reduction system for cut elimination in the style of
Dyckhoff (2011) and show that the term constructed for the end-
sequent is not normalizable. Our terms, which correspond to those
used by Barendregt and Ghilezan (2000), codify the fact that the cut
rule is a substitution rule corresponding to the combination of two
proofs in natural deduction, which is the semantically significant
aspect of it. We also do not discuss the issue of contraction, although
contraction is used in (14) and (15) at a crucial place and is very
important for the generation of paradoxes.
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knowledge of absurdity at all? Note that absurdity does not
just mean contradiction. In the last step of the proof of
absurdity we proceed from :R and R by modus ponens to
absurdity, from which we could proceed to any other
proposition. We are not proposing a paraconsistent system,
but a system, in which everything can be proved, though
not in a ‘first-class’ way. The fact that in a proof of t : ?
the term t is not normalizable, should perhaps not be given
too much weight, since normally one would argue that by
simply omitting the term information in a proof, and
keeping only the types, one would still be left with a proof,
though with a proof carrying less information. The idea of
distinguishing between first-class and second-class proofs
of the same proposition, and giving only the first-class ones
real epistemic significance is problematic. We want to have
no proof of absurdity at all, not a second-class proof of
absurdity that lacks certain global properties such as
normalizability.
6 Absurdity in Sequent-Style Reasoning
In the sequent-style framework we have obtained a deri-
vation of ‘ t : ? with a non-normalizable t by using the cut
rule. However, the cut rule is not a primitive rule of the
framework. So we are not entitled to use it, except we have
shown beforehand that it is eliminable. For many defini-
tions, this can be achieved, but not for DR: Epistemologi-
cally, we do not need to distinguish between first-class and
second-class proofs. Instead we can say that, with respect
to DR; we have both a proof of ‘ R and a proof of R ‘ ?;
but not a proof of ‘ ?: In other words, we have proofs of
both R and its negation, but not a proof of absurdity, which
means that our system is paraconsistent. This sort of
paraconsistency gives us the possibility to use definitions
like DR without devastating consequences. The principle of
definitional freedom need not be given up. That we gen-
erate a contradiction if we define R in a contradictory way,
is not implausible. We do not generate absurdity out of this
definition, not even some sort of ‘second-class’ absurdity.
This result is obtained by a particular feature of sequent-
style reasoning. The principle of cut is separated as a
special structural rule from the framework of the meaning-
giving rules. With respect to the meaning-giving rules,
nothing prevents us from giving up cut in principle. We
thereby depart radically from the fact that consequence
entails correct inference, one of the dogmas of standard
semantics, which is embodied in the principle of cut. Even
if we have established that B follows from A as expressed
by the sequent A ‘ B; this does not necessarily mean that, if
we have furthermore established ‘ A; we can establish ‘ B;
which is a case of cut. This feature: the separation of
meaning from transitivity in the sense of cut, is achieved by
the institution of left-introduction rules. In the sequent
calculus, we introduce assumptions (i.e., propositions in the
antecedent of a sequent) not only by trivial initial sequents
(which correspond to assumptions in natural deduction),
but by explicit assumption-introduction (= left-introduc-
tion) rules, which depend on the form of the assumption
being introduced. This is the proper way of taking
assumptions seriously, a way that overcomes the dogmas of
standard semantics. The primary relation is that of conse-
quence as expressed by the sequent sign, and we have rules
for assertion (right-rules) as well as rules for assumptions
(left-rules) which make up consequence. The fact that one
may join two consequence statements according to the
transmission view is something that depends on the pre-
supposed definition.
Combining proofs is a matter of a structural rule, namely
cut. It is not intertwined with meaning-giving principles.
This strongly speaks for the sequent-style approach to
reasoning. In our derivation of absurdity in the natural-
deduction framework (13)/(11), the problem arises with our
last application of modus ponens, which corresponds to the
final cut in the sequent-calculus derivation (14)/(15). But
we cannot just refrain from using modus ponens in a way in
which we can refrain from using cut, as modus ponens is an
indispensible meaning-giving principle, whereas cut is not,
as the meaning of implication is given by inference prin-
ciples of its own. Therefore, from a semantical point of
view, the parallel between cut elimination and normaliza-
tion is far from perfect. It makes a crucial difference of
whether the usage of a special local rule, namely cut, or the
global form of the whole proof, namely normalization, is at
stake. This comes to bear when there is no normalization/
cut elimination. Then in the sequent calculus the unprob-
lematic part can just be saved by removing the local cut
rule, whereas in natural deduction this part is defined by
some sophisticated global property (normalizability).
One might, of course, model natural deduction accord-
ing to the sequent calculus. One possibility would be to use
the strategy of generalized elimination inferences which
actually makes natural deduction a notational variant of the
sequent calculus, yielding something such as ‘bidirectional
natural deduction’ (Schroeder-Heister 2009). However, this
is not exactly our point here. We are comparing the
reasoning formats of natural deduction and the sequent
calculus, not ways of simulating one approach within the
other.
7 Consequence, Inference, Place-Holders: Intuitive
Account
Even if with DR we have an example of a situation in which
cut fails, there remains a gap between observing this fact
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and grasping it intuitively. Suppose we have established
A ‘ B as a consequence (for example, by a derivation in
our semantically motivated sequent calculus). Why cannot
we later use this consequence to guide an inference from
A to B? Why cannot we argue that, because we once have




Is it not the purpose of establishing consequences that we
may use them later on? For example, in the sequent-style
framework, it appears absolutely natural to use the
consequence A ^ B ‘ A in order to proceed by^-elimination
C ‘ A ^ B A ^ B ‘ A
C ‘ A
even without having demonstrated cut elimination. Telling
novices in logic that the correctness of this rule has to be
formally demonstrated would confuse them.
The reason for this confusion is that the proposition
being cut does not stand for the same in both of its posi-
tions. In the example, the left occurrence of A ^ B stands
for something different from its right occurrence. This
becomes clear, when the typed version is used:
C ‘ t : A ^ B x : A ^ B ‘ p1x : A
C ‘ p1t : A
In the left premiss we have a term t, and in the right
premiss we have the variable x, which, by applying cut,
becomes substituted. This means that in the case of cut,
different terms are involved, together with a substitution
operation which is hidden in the non-typed formulation.
This hidden substitution operation causes the problem in
critical cases. In the last step of our derivation (15) of \,
this substitution operation generates a term which is not
normalizable.
When we force such a substitution operation to be valid,
we end up in paradox. But the question still remains: What
is it intuitively that speaks against such a substitution?
A tentative answer might be the following. Semantically the
variable x in the right sequent of cut (7) is not understood
as running over all terms individually, i.e. over all proof
terms. Rather, it is understood as an objectual variable
running over an arbitrary proof object, abstracting from the
specific structure which concrete proofs may have. When
performing the substitution in the application of cut, we are
substituting this arbitrary object with an individual proof
term, which, when embedded into a new context, may
behave differently, as this proof term has a specific internal
structure. Thus we would invoke the difference made in
other areas of logic between objectual quantification,
substitutional quantification and arbitrary objects. This idea
still needs to be worked out in detail.
8 Closure Under Substitution and the Format
of Deductive Reasoning
To repeat, the situation arising with self-contradiction,
when treated in a typed system, is that a substitution of a
normal term into a normal term results in a non-normal and
non-normalizable term. In the sequent calculus, this is due
to the application of cut, which is a substitution rule:
D ‘ t : A D; x : A ‘ s : C
D ‘ s½x=t : C
Even if s and t are normal, s[x/t] does not need to be
normal nor to be normalizable. In natural deduction,
a corresponding situation obtains with modus ponens:
s : A ! B t : A
Appðs; tÞ : B
Even it s and t are normal, App(s, t) does not need to be
normal or normalizable. Our derivations (11) and (15)
exemplify this. The advantage of the cut rule is that it
makes this substitution operation explicit. By disallowing
cut, or by using cut only for definitions, for which we can
prove beforehand that cut can be eliminated, we can dis-
pose of the substitution problem.
Now it might be considered a too radical solution: either
not to use cut or to prove a cut-elimination theorem
beforehand. One might consider instead the idea to use cut
whenever it is appropriate, without expecting it to be
globally admissible. This could be achieved by means of a
side condition, saying that cut can be applied whenever the
substitution term generated by cut is normalizable. If we
denote the normalizability of a term t by t!, we could then
formulate the restricted cut rule as follows:
D ‘ t : A D; x : A ‘ s : C
D ‘ s½x=t : C s½x=t!
One must be aware, however, that the side condition goes
beyond usual side conditions in proofs as it is not always
decidable (depending on the system considered). So one
would have to give at least a proof system by means of
which s[x/t]! can be established, in such a way that the
finitistic concept of ‘proof’ is not given up.
In the natural deduction framework, modus ponens with
the corresponding side condition would be
s : A ! B t : A
Appðs; tÞ : B Appðs; tÞ!
However, this is still not exactly the same situation as in
the sequent system. The terms s and t may contain free
variables, as the judgements s : A ? B and t : A may
depend on assumptions. Suppose t, but not s contains the
free variable y, and t : A depends on the assumption y :
D, so that we have the situation:





s : A ! B t : A
App s; tð Þ : B App s; tð Þ!
Now suppose we have a derivation of t0 : D, and suppose
we want, by substituting t0 for y, to combine these two






s : A ! B t y=t0½  : A
App s; t y=t0½ ð Þ : B App s; t y=t
0½ ð Þ!
Then we have to check the validity of the side condition,
and of all other side conditions in the derivation above it
again, as they are not necessarily closed under substitution
(in fact, our self-contradiction example demonstrates this
non-closure). In the sequent-calculus framework, in the
same situation, we would simply add another cut with an
additional side condition:
Here only this additional step needs to be checked, there is
no need to rework the whole proof.5 In a natural-deduction-
style formulation this can be achieved by restricting the
combination (substitution) of natural-deduction proofs.
However, formulating such restrictions essentially means
to give up the natural deduction framework in favor of a
sequent-style framework (even though this would be in a
natural-deduction-style notation).
The idea of closure under substitution is deeply built
into the framework of natural deduction. Imposing side
conditions that are not automatically closed under substi-
tution represents a reasoning format that is very difficult to
handle. In the sequent calculus, on the contrary, substitu-
tion just means applying a rule (namely cut), so substitu-
tion is a local principle rather than a global one.
The locality of substitution is what in our eyes ulti-
mately speaks for the sequent format of reasoning. It gives
up the dogmas of standard semantics by making the
application of consequence, i.e., the transmission of truth, a
local issue of rule application rather than a global issue of
the reasoning framework.
9 Free Type Theory
We have discussed the possibility of a local rule of cut
depending on the side condition that the term being con-
structed by the substitution operation denotes (is
normalizable):
D ‘ t : A D; x : A ‘ s : C
D ‘ s½x=t : C s½x=t!
This may suggest the idea of incorporating the side
condition, which is an external proviso, into an actual
premiss of the cut:
D ‘ t : A D; x : A ‘ s : C s½x=t!
D ‘ s½x=t : C
We would obtain some sort of free type theory in which,
before generating a term by means of cut, we must first
show that it denotes. The type-theoretic view that proofs
are objects named by terms would then be combined with
the idea of free logic that certain names denote whereas
others do not, and for certain inferences and names
t occurring in them, there would be the premiss t!
expressing that t denotes. The ‘denotes’-claim expressed by
the exclamation mark would be an additional form of
judgement, for which corresponding proof rules would
have to be given. This is a wide field and can here just be
proposed as a possible research programme.
Such a programme does not appear totally unreasonable.
If we consider type theory in Martin-Lo¨f’s setting, then one
of its characteristic features is that the formation rules are
not external, but part of the intrinsic framework. Before we
can prove t : A, i.e., that t has type A, we must prove first
A type, i.e. the fact that A makes sense as a type, according
to the proof rules for the ‘type’-judgement, which are the
formation rules. Now if there are formation rules for types,
one might argue that there should be formation rules for
terms as well in the sense that, before one can judge that t is
of type A, one must also show that t makes sense as a term,
as expressed by the judgement t!. Spelling this out in detail
requires reworking the whole framework of type theory and
especially its ontology, to adapt it to a definitional frame-
work where no well-foundedness assumptions are made.
In this paper, we have focussed on the impact which the
proof-theoretic treatment of the paradoxes has on the
appropriate choice of the format of deductive reasoning,
and have claimed that a sequent-style format is more
appropriate than natural deduction. Given our consider-
ations on normalization and denotation of proof terms, one
might try to develop a general theory of sense and deno-
tation of proofs. Some steps in this direction have
been taken by Tranchini (2011), who argues that proofs are
meaningful (have sense) if they follow a principle of local
harmony (which is, for example, not satisfied by Prior’s
5 Note that, as we have assumed that y is not free in s, s[x/t][y/t0] is
the same as s[x/t[y/t0]].
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tonk connective), whereas they denote when in addition
they can be reduced to canonical form. Further pursuing
this idea will be a natural continuation of what has been
presented here.
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